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Abstract
The theory of insurance law and economics holds that the insured will display less
care as a consequence of the insurance coverage. It also holds that bad risks are
more likely than good risks to display demand for coverage. These behavioural pre-
dictions, which are associated with moral hazard and adverse selection respectively,
are firmly embedded in rational choice theory. This paper reviews empirical findings
and addresses the question how close insurance law and economics theory is to in-
surance reality. Indeed, it seems that insurance law and economics theory can be
enriched by empiricism. Review of empirical evidence nuances some of the theoreti-
cal predictions and offers a proper occasion for investigating the policy implications.
Both strands are explored.
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1. Introduction
[253] Any study book on insurance will teach that insurance contracts typically influ-
ence behaviour of the parties involved, both prior to and after conclusion of the con-
tract. When an insured holidaymaker no longer faces the financial consequences of
losing his camera, he is bound to display less care and may thus in fact loose his
camera sooner than he would without insurance. Likewise, if consulting a GP is cov-
ered by health insurance, irrespective of the number of calls, overconsumption has to
be feared.
Moreover, insurance theory not merely predicts that concluded insurance contracts
influence the insured’s behaviour but it also assumes that the decision to insure is
invariably consistent and commensurate with the insured’s risk aversion. Within this
rational choice framework, people are assumed to choose insurance to avert the
threat of financial losses which they prefer not to bear themselves. Therefore, the in-
sured will choose the optimal contract assuming that he has optimal information on
both the extent of the risk and the content of the policy, and he operates on an effi-
cient insurance market.
Rational choice also implies that insurance companies must heed adverse selection.
The insurer has inferior information on the magnitude of the risk to which the insured
is personally exposed. Assuming that those running the bigger risk will have a pro-
portionate demand for insurance, insurers will experience an ever increasing claims
rate. Insurers will typically want to inform themselves of the risk attributes of the in-
sured and adjust premium accordingly in order to avoid adverse selection.
[254] Admittedly, the previous is merely a set of theoretical assumptions on both the
insured’s and the insurer’s thinking and deciding. In this paper, I would like to review
the evidence: how rational is the demand for insurance, how truthful is the threaten-
ing picture of moral hazard and how lifelike is the adverse selection theorem? The
approach taken is rather straightforward: first, I will review the empirical evidence
against the background of insurance theory (§ 2) and then I will elaborate on the pol-
icy implications of the findings (§ 3). Note that the following focuses on individuals
rather than enterprises as consumers of insurance products. The analysis is, how-
ever, not restricted to this type of the insured.
2. Is theory reflected in practice?
2.1 Demand for insurance in an empirical perspective
Rational choice assumes that risk-averse individuals will have a demand for insur-
ance products that increase their expected utility.2 A crucial element in this assump-
tion is that individuals are capable of a realistic risk assessment. Psychological re-
search into – inter alia – decision making under uncertainty has cast some doubt on
man’s cognitive abilities needed for this assessment task. Moreover, although full in-
formation disclosure may reduce asymmetries and thus increase the quality of the
decision-making process,3 it may not necessarily lead to optimal utility increasing de-
2 Seminal Pratt 1964, p. 122 et seq. and Arrow 1965, p. 1 et seq.
3 On information regulation and its limitations, Ogus 1994, p. 121 et seq.
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cisions. For instance, the decision-making process of the insured may be thwarted by
the influence of cognitive heuristics and biases. For instance, demand for flood insur-
ance may soar in an area recently struck by terrestrial floods as a result of a tempo-
rary overestimation of the flooding risk (sc. availability bias) and a preference for an
excess (deductible) may be influenced by the insurers advertising framing the excess
as a rebate. Such influences may indeed amount to inefficiency.4
Add-on insurance policies may be prototypical of the issue at hand. These policies
are offered as a secondary product with a primary product such as credit card loans
and consumer electronics and cell phones. The marketing technique employed to sell
add-on insurance in consumer electronics for instance is rather sophisticated: as
soon as the consumer has decided to buy the product, he is offered the opportunity
to buy additional insurance to protect his newly acquired property.5 Given that he has
just been endowed with property, he may then not be able to objectively weigh the
premium cost against the probability of loss. This may in fact influence his willingness
to avoid the loss and it may even influence the insured’s willingness to obtain addi-
tional information on the terms of the contract (either at the counter or afterwards if a
[255] termination clause or cooling-off period applies). Admittedly, the proposition of
these causative mechanisms is speculation on my part but research does show that
the claims/premium ratio in some of these add-on insurance policies is hugely disad-
vantageous for consumers. This implies that there is a structural market failure in op-
eration in these particular markets.6 Possibly, one of the causes for this unbalance is
a combination of information asymmetry on the actual need for such insurance and
the ‘endowment effect’ on the side of the insured.7
Actual demand for disaster coverage also shows puzzling aberrations from theoreti-
cal prediction. In countries where voluntary flood insurance is available, it is not al-
ways taken out by those who most need it.8 Similar under-insurance is reported con-
cerning earthquake risks.9 In fact, ‘salience bias’ may influence demand in the sense
that following an earthquake demand for home-owners earthquake insurance in-
creases sharply only to drop within months later. Indeed, research has found flood
and earthquake insurance purchases to be correlated with the level of disaster losses
in the preceding year.10 At first blush this all seems at odds with the expected utility
hypothesis, or do civilians living in areas prone to flooding or quake disaster have an
extraordinary appetite for risk? Admittedly, such behaviour can plausibly be ex-
plained by the lack of accurate information on the magnitude of the risk and potential
benefits of insurance. Government policy could counter such informational deficien-
cies by informing the public most at risk of the ‘pros and cons’ of disaster insurance.11
Nonetheless, perfect information processing is unattainable as a result of bounded
rationality and so-called biases in individuals’ risk assessment.12
4 See the overview presented by Johnson et al. 1993, p. 35-51.
5 Similar techniques are applied in the sale of extended warranties in consumer products.
6 Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 1997, p. 1 et seq.
7 Note that the endowment effect and its extent are debated. See, e.g., Zeiler and Plott 2005, p. 530 et
seq.
8 See, e.g., Zeckhauser 1996, p. 113 et seq.; Kunreuther 1996, p. 171 et seq.; Endres et al. 2003, p. 284
et seq.; Kunreuther and Pauly 2004, p. 5 et seq. Cf. Kunreuther 2006, p. 175 et seq.
9 Kunreuther et al. 1992, p. 60-68. Cf. Faure and Hartlief 2006a, p. 439 f.
10 See, e.g., Browne and Hoyt 2000 p. 291 et seq.
11 Generally on information policies Schwartz and Wilde 1979, p. 630-682; Ogus 1994, p. 121 et seq.
12 Cf. Thomas 2007, p. 117 et seq. Generally on bounded abilities Slovic 2000, p. 1et seq.; Korobkin and
Ulen 2000, p. 1069 et seq.
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Moreover, there is some indication of a lack of willingness to insure against catastro-
phic damage. Decisions to insure against loss is said to be considered an investment
decision: by investing a fixed premium one hopes to ‘gain’ by profiting from the cov-
erage in case of disaster. Insuring against a low probability high damage event may
thus be thought to be a less wise investment than insuring against more frequently
occurring events.13 If we combine these findings with the influence of ‘salience bias’,
we can conclude that demand for disaster insurance is potentially in danger of being
wrenched. Unfortunately, the [256] ex post stance of politicians is also unhelpful in
this respect. Whenever a great number of citizens are left uncompensated from large
scale disasters, electoral interests may press politicians to express solidarity and
generosity by compensating perfectly insurable interests anyway by courtesy of the
taxpayer. Why develop a demand for voluntary insurance coverage if the state
comes to the rescue anyway?14 There is, however, no strong empirical evidence for
such calculating behaviour in citizens.15
There is another issue concerning insurance demand potentially inconsistent with the
expected utility hypothesis. In the 19th century, in some countries child life insurance
emerged as a means of financial protection of parents against loss of income and
burial costs in the unhappy but all too common event of their child’s death. Later,
when financial loss was no longer to be expected from a child’s death, the policy re-
mained popular.16 Possibly, emotionally valued relationships are thus substituted by
insurance compensation ‘as a token of consolation’.17 A similar willingness to insure
against non-pecuniary loss (loss of amenities, enjoyment of life, etcetera) is con-
firmed by experimental research.18
In conclusion, the previous somewhat smoothes the rough edges of the rationality
assumption in insurance demand. Insurance decisions do not seem to be fully sub-
ject to expected utility in economic terms: disaster insurance is not always purchased
where purchase would converge with utility, whereas child life insurance is pur-
chased where purchase does actually not converge with utility. This may indeed give
further credence to the strand in literature holding that individuals pursue happiness
rather than maximal economic welfare.19
2.2 Adverse or propitious selection?
Theory holds that adverse selection is always lurking to cause a downward spiral to-
wards uninsurability if it is not remedied by incentives for the insured to reduce risk
(e.g., risk and premium differentiation, excess/deductibles, policy limits).20 Is there
13 Schoemaker and Kunreuther 1979, p. 603-618; Slovic 2000, p. 62 et seq. Cf. the experiment by
McClelland et al. 1993, p. 95 et seq.
14 Epstein 1996, p. 287 et seq.; Harrington 2000, p. 40 et seq.
15 Kunreuther et al. 1978, p. 1 et seq.; Kunreuther 2006a, p. 208 et seq.
16 Zelizer 1981, p. 1036-1056.
17 See the analysis by Hsee and Kunreuther 2000, p. 141 et seq. Concerning child life insurance, one
can also speculate on status quo bias as a cause of continued demand for this (in pecuniary terms: su-
perfluous) insurance.
18 Avraham 2005, p. 941 et seq.
19 See, e.g., Frey and Stutzer 2002, p. 1 et seq.; Frey and Stutzer 2005, p. 207 et seq.; Adler and Posn-
er 2007, p. 1 et seq.
20 See the theory as presented by, e.g., Harrington and Niehaus 2004, p. 186 et seq.; Rejda 2003, p. 23;
Schulenburg 2005, p. 297 et seq. Cf. Eisenhauer 2004, p. 165. Cf. Priest 1987, p. 1521 et seq. On the
underlying problem of information asymmetry, see, e.g., Rothschild and Stiglitz 1976, p. 629-649.
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any empirical evidence of adverse selection? Well, yes and no. [257] Sometimes, the
evidence of adverse selection is rather convincing.21 But generally speaking, there is
the methodological problem of measurement. It is rather difficult to take an action pic-
ture of adverse selection. In this respect it somewhat resembles the Abominable
Snowman: testimonies abound but tangible or visible evidence is less readily avail-
able. In some studies positive correlation of risk levels and insurance demand is used
as a proxy for (the risk of) adverse selection.22 With such proxies, the following out-
comes were generated:
No evidence of adverse selection: Evidence of adverse selection:
• Life insurance in the USA23 • Annuities in the UK24
• Motor vehicle insurance in
France25
• Crop insurance in the USA26
• Health Insurance in the USA27 • Health Insurance in the USA28
Unsurprisingly, the evidence is not pointing in one single direction.29 This does not tell
us much. Generally speaking, research seems to indicate that the extent of adverse
selection depends on the insurance market at hand. Adverse selection is not an iso-
lated phenomenon but instead very much dependent on specific market circum-
stances. If the insurance market does not make an effort of premium differentiation
and both bad and good risks are unaware of their status, movement of clientele is
unlikely to occur. Furthermore, the insured may have superior information but never-
theless refrain from using it, for example because the transaction cost of switching
from one insurer to another are too high.30
Looking at adverse selection from another point of view, it seems advisable not to
jump to conclusions too soon. If adverse selection is hard to prove, we should equally
heed jumping to conclusions on causes of soaring premiums, increasing number of
policy exclusions and full withdrawal from specific markets. Obviously, these phe-
nomena are well known in some areas of insurance, but one should not readily as-
sume that these phenomena are in any way connected to (combating) adverse selec-
tion. The causal connection is plausible but difficult to substantiate empirically.31
[258] Some have even cast doubts on the soundness of the theory of adverse selec-
tion by arguing that in fact the opposite phenomenon can be witnessed: those that
have the least need for insurance are most likely to buy it. In essence, this strand in
insurance economics holds that there is a positive correlation between loss aversion
21 Thomas 2007, p. 105 et seq. See the excellent overview of empirical studies by Siegelman 2004, p.
1223 et seq.
22 Note that economists are still in the process of developing methodology in this respect; see, e.g.,
Huang et al. 2006, p. 1 et seq.
23 Cawley and Philipson 1999, p. 827 et seq.
24 Finkelstein and Poterba 2004, p. 183 et seq.; Finkelstein and Poterba 2006, p. 1 et seq.
25 Chiappori and Salanie 2000, p. 56 et seq.
26 Makki and Somwaru 2001, p. 685 et seq.
27 Cardon and Hendel 2001, p. 408 et seq.
28 Cutler and Zeckhauser 1997, p. 1 et seq.
29 Eisenhauer 2004, p. 166.
30 On the influence of such factors, see, e.g. Thomas 2007, p. 117 et seq.
31 Thomas 2007, p. 115.
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and carefulness in day-to-day life.32 From an insurer's point of view, this ‘propitious
selection’ or ‘advantageous selection’ hypothesis is good news. To whom would you
most like to sell motor insurance: a member of the local Hells Angels branch or the
local vicar? Moreover, if the vicar turns out to be most likely to buy your insurance
and least likely to claim under the policy, surely this is beneficial to the insurance
company’s claims/premium ratio. All the more reason for empiricists to look into the
evidence: is there any truth to the ‘propitious selection’ hypothesis? To a certain ex-
tent, there is indeed evidence of propitious selection. In legal systems where motor
liability insurance is not compulsory, it has been found that those who do not take out
insurance are more accident-prone than others. On this basis it has been argued that
those who do take out insurance have less use of it. Other research indicates a posi-
tive correlation between purchasing health insurance (in countries where this is a
voluntary insurance) and buckling up when driving, as well as a negative correlation
between health insurance purchase and drunk driving. Moreover, there is also evi-
dence – in some countries at least – that persons buying life insurance have a longer
life expectancy than those not buying it (controlled for income differences).33
Propitious selection reveals personality traits in the insured and his preference for
insurance.34 Note that, as always, evidence of correlation seems easier to obtain
than evidence of the causative mechanism. Assuming then that the propitious selec-
tion proposition is correct in the sense that the stronger the risk aversion in individu-
als, the more likely these individuals are to take out insurance and display careful-
ness in avoiding the insured event, then obviously the insurance industry is most in-
terested in identifying these individuals: they have a stronger appetite for insurance
than others and meanwhile they will [259] claim less than others.35 Moreover, this
appetite may be amplified by the fact that risk aversion is also said to be correlated
with overestimation of risk.36
To conclude, there is little evidence as to whether propitious selection is a weaker or
stronger driver in insurance market failure than adverse selection. It seems likely that
this depends on the specific insurance product at hand. From a practical point of
view, if the claims/premium ratio of a certain insurance product is extremely favour-
able to the insurance industry, this may be an indication of propitious selection.37 Fur-
32 Seminal Hemenway 1990, p. 1063 et seq.; Chiappori and Salanie 2000, p. 56 et seq.; cf. Eisenhauer
2004, p. 167 et seq. Note that there is disagreement on the exact extent of this phenomenon; cf. De
Donder and Hindriks 2006, p. 1 et seq.
33 Cf. Cawley and Philipson 1999, p. 827 et seq.; Mahdavi s.d., p. 3. Contrast Li et al. 2007, p. 441 et
seq., who demonstrate a correlation between insured’s choice for a higher deductible and careful driving
behaviour.
34 A first indication of propitious selection is also to be seen in the Dutch health insurance market, which
is a mixed system of a compulsory insurance contract consisting of a basic coverage and a voluntary
additional coverage for specific health care expenses. Research shows a positive correlation between
the choice for a relatively low deductible in the compulsory insurance contract and opting-in for the addi-
tional coverage. Smit and Mokveld 2006, p. 14. As such, this merely expresses risk aversion. It does not
demonstrate that those with a preference for insurance consume less than others.
35 Using propitious selection as a marketing tool for insurance seems even more promising if it is possi-
ble to find other personality traits that correlate with increased willingness to buy insurance. To some
extent, this seems possible. A study into bad hospital debts (Clyde et al. 1996, p. 100 et seq.) showed a
positive correlation between not using safety belts, not having a health insurance and defaulting on hos-
pital debts, which may be relevant for hospital debtor risk containment strategies.
36 That is at least a conclusion that can be inferred from Andersson and Lundborg 2007, p. 67 et seq.
Note also that risk aversion and income are (moderately) positively correlated. See Cohen and Einav
2007, p. 745 et seq.
37 See Office of Fair Trading (OFT) 1997, p. 1 et seq.
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ther research is needed to establish the cause – perhaps (other) information asym-
metries or aggressive marketing strategies are involved.
2.3 Empirical evidence of moral hazard?
In this section I look into the so-called ‘ex ante moral hazard’.38 This phenomenon is
theoretically grounded on the prediction in (insurance) economic theory that individu-
als shielded from financial loss by insurance coverage will demonstrate adapted be-
haviour and will thus actually increase the risk of the insured loss.39 The moral hazard
hypothesis has a long history of influencing both scholarly and practical debates on
insurance. Interestingly, in 19th century England child life insurance was heavily de-
bated from a moral hazard point of view: some argued that parents would be enticed
to neglect or even murder their offspring in order to collect on the insurance. Others
argued – very much in line with the propitious selection argument – that this type of
insurance was mostly obtained by the thrifty and respectable who had little reason for
infanticide.40
In contrast to this type of ‘moralizing’ rhetoric, less attention has been paid to the
empirical comprehensiveness of moral hazard. Again, empirical evidence seems dif-
ficult to obtain since human behaviour is hardly ever exclusively driven by one de-
terminant. Influences countering moral hazard dispositions range from internalized
ethical considerations to external drivers such as criminal prosecution for negligence.
[260] The evidence seems to suggest that moral hazard is more likely to occur in
some insurance markets than others.41 Research has found evidence of both ex ante
and ex post moral hazard in workers’ compensation. A positive correlation has also
been demonstrated between increase of statutory sick pay levels and the recovery
period of employees suffering from difficult to diagnose diseases (such as lower back
pain).42 Other research shows a positive correlation between increase of the cover-
age – both in time and level of compensation – and the number of both accidents and
sick leave.43 American research has furthermore shown that moral hazard in workers’
compensation not merely shifts costs from one party to another but can also frustrate
productivity.44
Less emphatic is research that was able to demonstrate moral hazard in consump-
tion of general practitioners' visits but unable regarding hospital admission. We can
assume that the threshold for increasing consumption of the latter is much higher.
This would indicate that moral hazard is a bigger problem in insurance products that
38 Intentional fraud in the sense of fabrication of an accident or simulation of damage is not dealt with
here. On this ‘ex post moral hazard’ see, e.g., Cummins and Tennyson 1996, p. 29 et seq.; Bolduc et al.
2002, p. 623 et seq.
39 See Dionne 1981, p. 422-423; Dionne 2000, p. 153; Parsons 2003, p. 448 et seq.; Shavell 2005, p.
63 et seq.; Shavell 1986, p. 43-58; Schulenburg 2005, p. 282 et seq.; Baker 1996, p. 267 et seq.;
Adams 1985, p. 1 et seq., Finsinger 1983, p. 1 et seq. and Finsinger 1988, p. 1 et seq.
40 Strange 2005, p. 231 et seq.; Wohl 1983, p. 34 et seq.; Zelizer 1985/1994, p. 73 et seq.
41 Chiappori 2000a, p. 371.
42 Dionne and St-Michel 1991, p. 236. Cf. Cummins and Tennyson 1996, p. 29 et seq.; Bolduc et al.
2002, p. 623 et seq.; Butler and Worrall 1991, p. 191 et seq. Contra Baril and Lanoie 1996, p. 1 et seq.
43 Overview at Fortin and Lanoie 2000, p. 421 et seq. Cf. Johansson and Palme 2005, p. 1879 et seq.
44 Butler et al. 1998, p. 671 et seq.
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have a lower level of cost of behavioural change. 45 Relevant is also American re-
search which showed that the introduction of compulsory auto insurance in fact in-
creased accident rates.46
In conclusion it can be said that, yes, there is the problem of moral hazard, but no, it
is impossible to generalize the results of the empirical studies available. Possibly,
moral hazard is more of a problem regarding two types of insurance benefits. Firstly,
moral hazard may be a more serious issue if the benefit is acquired by changing be-
haviour at relatively low costs (relative elasticity of demand of general practitioners’
services versus relative inelasticity of hospital admission; moreover, in order to be
submitted to a hospital one generally needs to have more severe health complaints
and pass a gatekeeper of some sort). Secondly, insurance products where the in-
sured stands to gain considerably from the insurance rather than merely be indemni-
fied by it may be more problematic. Admittedly, those cases would sooner amount to
fraud rather than inadvertent negligence.
2.4 How does the insurance industry actually respond?
Theory has it that insurers fight moral hazard and adverse selection by asking risk
assessment questions at the conclusion stage of the insurance contract, by [261] risk
and premium differentiation and by providing incentives in the policy such as intro-
ducing limits, deductibles/excess clauses, warranties, and disclosure duties, et cet-
era.47
Indeed, insurers will emphasize that they “have found ways of dealing with the prob-
lem of moral hazards by implementing mechanisms that protect the insurance
scheme from undue exploitation and bad risks.” 48
One of these ways is the well-known deductible (excess); there is ample empirical
evidence of the efficacy of deductibles in health insurance. It seems that the deducti-
ble has to be set at an effective level: applying a deductible for every doctor’s visit is
more effective in reducing health care consumption than a singular annual deduction
irrespective of the number of visits.49 Moreover, the actual form of the deductible can
be of influence as well, or so it seems. In financial terms, an annual deductible of €
150 is fairly equal to a proportionate no-claim return of € 150 at the end of each year.
The insured, however, may react differently. In The Netherlands, for instance, the
2007 statute introducing a health insurance scheme started out with a no-claim re-
turn, but as of 2008 this has been changed into a deductible. It turned out that the no-
claim regime was not effective in reducing health care demand.50 The government
argued that this was caused by the psychological deficit of a return: the financial con-
sequences of health care consumption are not felt immediately and this causes con-
45 Sapelli and Vial 2003, p. 459 et seq. Cf. Vera-Hernández 2003, p. 670 et seq. Note that Dave and
Kaestner 2006, p. 1 et seq. indicate that moral hazard in the sense of increased consumption of general
practitioner aid under senior citizens under the USA Medicaid regime has other positive health effects.
46 Cohen and Dehejia 2004, p. 2004, p. 357 et seq.
47 See, e.g., Harrington and Niehaus 2004, p. 179 et seq.; Faure and Bergh 1989, p. 114-122; Faure
and Hartlief 1998, p. 697 et seq. ; Katzenmeier 2002, p. 1455 f.
48 Liedtke 2007, p. 217.
49 Agurzky et al. 2006, p. 1 et seq.
50 In 2004, a Dutch Government Agency theorized that no-claim return would suppress increasing health
care consumption (CPB Notitie “De invoering van een no-claimteruggaveregeling in de ZFW” d.d. 31
maart 2004). Ex post research showed that the no-claim return had no such downward effect of any
significance (Goudriaan et al. 2007, p. 1 et seq.).
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sumers to attach different value to postponed financial benefits and immediate finan-
cial detriment. 51 Note that the time value of money may be have to discounted as
well here when framing the financial incentive; Thaler and Sunstein would probably
consider this to be an issue of ‘nudging’.52
Another experiment with alternatives for deductibles is the so-called Medical Savings
Account, where the insured witnessed that part of his monthly premium was credited
onto a blocked bank account with which he could pay for health care services during
the running period of the insurance policy. This setup made the insured pay not only
a risk premium but also a savings premium, which made him co-owner of the insured
risk. The behavioural effects of the Medical Savings Account seem promising.53 Per-
haps the psychology of saving works better than the psychology used in deductibles
and no-claim returns. [262] What one saves is already considered to be part of one’s
patrimony and the willingness to part with one’s property is thought to be less than
the willingness to acquire it.54 This discrepancy may be relevant for insurers and leg-
islators when deciding on what form to frame in the deductibles.
Unsurprisingly, the majority of the examples given here relate to health insurance. In
most Western countries this insurance market is troubled in many respects and it is
hardly astonishing that both insurers and legislators are looking at various methods
of curbing demand for health care services. There are other insurance markets, how-
ever, where there is less activity to be seen on the side of the insurance industry in
countering moral hazard and adverse selection. In some insurance products there is
a disconcerting lack of premium differentiation or a lack of interest in controlling the
insured’s behaviour.55
Obviously, insurers as a rule try to fix the right premium level at the beginning of the
insurance contract by collecting information from the insured, but the cost of monitor-
ing the insured during the running period of the contract are usually considered to be
excessive compared to the expected benefits thereof.56 So, less energy is spent on
monitoring the insured, but that does not mean that this is an inefficient state of af-
fairs: the cost of controlling moral hazard and avoiding adverse selection must be set
off against the expected benefits. Some degree of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion can be efficient, provided that the insurance market at hand itself is functioning
properly. Nevertheless, too little effort by the insurance industry may result in an inef-
ficient level of precaution and may eventually indeed cause adverse selection and
uninsurability.
3. Relevance of behavioural insights for European insurance law and policy
Having explored some of the empirical findings on behaviour of both the insured and
the insurer, we now turn to the relevance for legal policy: are there lessons for insur-
ance law to be learned by legislators and courts? Obviously, the empirical studies
51 See Parliamentary Proceedings 2d Chamber 2006/07 (Kamerstukken II 2006/07, 31 094, nr. 3).
52 Thaler and Sunstein 2008, p. 1 et seq.
53 Schreyögg 2004, p. 689 et seq.
54 On endowment effect (divestiture aversion), e.g., Korobkin and Ulen 2000, p. 1107 et seq. ; Kahne-
man et al. 2003, p. 55 et seq.
55 E.g., Faure and Van den Bergh 1989, p. 308 et seq.; Van Boom and Pinna 2007, p. 158 et seq.
(concerning medical liability insurance).
56 See, e.g., the extensive study by Baker and Griffith on the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance
(Baker and Griffith 2007, p. 487 et seq.; Baker and Griffith 2007a, p. 1795 et seq.). On monitoring cost in
general, e.g., Ogus 2006, p. 108 f.
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reported here are merely ‘snapshots’ of practice that do not disclose a coherent pic-
ture invalidating or affirming insurance economical theory. The available material is
not consistently pointing in one direction. Having said that, the review of empirical
evidence nuances some of the theoretical assumptions and offers a proper occasion
for investigating the policy implications.
[263]
3.1 Insurance demand and information
If courts and legislators take the view that the insurance contract is a welfare enhanc-
ing vehicle, they will obviously try to address market failures. For instance, the duty
on the insured to disclose material information is traditionally justified with reference
to information asymmetry inhibiting an efficient contract. Likewise, legal policy may
be aimed at reducing the reverse information gap between insurer and insured. Does
the insured have enough information to compare insurance offers and to appraise
policy techniques, terms, and exclusions? Is transparent information easy to come by
in the insurance market or is it a market in which premium is the only visible object of
competition? In consumer insurance markets the latter seems to be the actual case
whereas the former seems to be more and more the policy objective.
For instance, under French law every seller of an insurance policy must inform the
consumer of the essential characteristics of the policy.57 Under the recent German
Insurance Contract Act 2008, the insurer has a potentially far-reaching and specific
obligation to obtain information from the client and advise what insurance to buy on
the basis of this information.58 According to Dutch law, the direct writer in indemnity
insurance is obliged to furnish the potential client ‘information needed for forming an
adequate opinion’ of the insurance contract.59 The Unfair Commercial Practices Di-
rective (2005/29/EC) generally forbids insurers from withholding material information
“that the average consumer needs, according to the context, to take an informed
transactional decision and thereby causes or is likely to cause the average consumer
to take a transactional decision that he would not have taken otherwise”.60
This begs the question what information is really needed by the insured prior to con-
tracting. Assessing both the quality of the insurance product and [264] whether it
matches his preferences is a difficult task for individuals and SMEs lacking specific
insurance knowledge. If I were to take out a Payment Protection Insurance with my
credit card or hire-purchase agreement, I could be expected to be interested in the
magnitude of the risk of default: how likely is it that an individual of my age and edu-
57 Article L. 111-1 du Code de la Consommation (‘Tout professionnel vendeur de biens ou prestataire de
services doit, avant la conclusion du contrat, mettre le consommateur en mesure de connaître les carac-
téristiques essentielles du bien ou du service.’). Cf. Lambert-Faivre and Leveneur 2005, p. 127 ; see
also Clarke 2007, p. 99-100 ; Basedow and Fock 2002, p. 30 et seq.
58 § 6 (1) Versicherungsvertragsgesetz 2008. Note that § 6 also states that the extent of this duty de-
pends on a certain proportionality between the cost of such advice and the expected premium.
59 Article 4:20 Financial Supervision Act (Wet Financieel Toezicht).
60 Note that Directive 2002/65/EC concerning the distance marketing of consumer financial services
merely pays lip service to the transparency principle. Recital 21 states: “In the interests of transparency
this Directive lays down the requirements needed to ensure that an appropriate level of information is
provided to the consumer both before and after conclusion of the contract. The consumer should re-
ceive, before conclusion of the contract, the prior information needed so as to properly appraise the fi-
nancial service offered to him and hence make a well-informed choice.” In fact, the Directive does not
really deal with disclosure duties of a substantive kind as dealt with here.
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cation will default on his credit obligations due to illness as defined by the PPI policy?
This type of aggregate information is usually not given and not generated by the
market, leaving the insured to make a private risk assessment. If indeed, as men-
tioned earlier, willingness to insure is correlated with exaggerated risk perception,
then this bias may cause the purchase of ‘unnecessary’ insurance. Market specific
information may shed further light on this demand issue. Now suppose that PPI has a
claims/premium ratio of 20 %, which denotes that for every Euro in premium the in-
surance company pays out 20 Eurocents in covered claims. If the median ratio in
comparable consumer insurance products is 50%, one could argue that there is
something atypical and possibly problematic about PPI. Perhaps consumers claim
less under the PPI, have less need for it, or the policy exclusions bar a considerable
number of their claims? Perhaps the marketing technique used in selling PPI should
be scrutinized. Perhaps if it is sold as an ‘over the counter’ add-on insurance right
after the moment of purchase of the primary product, the willingness to insure newly
acquired property is at its strongest at that precise moment. Then, the marketing
technique of the add-on product may in part be the cause of the low claims-premium
ratio.61 This is not to say that the add-on product necessarily is a scam and that peo-
ple should be protected against it by banning it; that would amount to overzealous
paternalism against which Ogus has warned.62 This issue does illustrate that it is dif-
ficult to assess what information consumers actually need to make a balanced choice
in buying insurance.
3.2 Insurable interest
Many legal systems are critical of insurance products other than indemnity insurance.
If an insurance policy does not indemnify but merely pays out a certain amount – for
instance, in case of life insurance – the insured may lack a financial interest which is
compensated. It has been argued that without an insurable interest, insurance might
lead to negative externalities. Such insurance may amount to illegal gambling and
may cause serious moral hazard issues.63 On the other hand, as the example of child
life insurance shows, people may have a preference for insuring in order to compen-
sate the loss of non-pecuniary relationships with money. They may even – as some
research suggests – have a willingness to insure against non-pecuniary loss in gen-
eral. If indeed individuals in some respects have such preferences, what implications
does this have for the [265] doctrine of insurable interest? There is much to be said
for the approach taken by the Dutch legislator which has stipulated that other types of
insurance than indemnity insurance and life insurance are only allowed if so provided
by royal decree.64 This allows for careful consideration of, e.g., moral hazard con-
cerns.
61 Cf. research by the English Office of Fair Trading into PPI. Cf. Office of Fair Trading 2006, p. 1 et seq.
and the commissioned market studies by London Economics.
62 Ogus 2006, p. 31; p. 227-228, p. 252.
63 Rea 1993, p. 147.147. Cf. Clarke 2007, p. 36 et seq.
64 Article 7:964 Dutch Civil Code.
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3.3 Moral hazard and adverse selection
Insurance law and policy practice provide insurers with a number of tools to fight
moral hazard and adverse selection. Indeed, the fundamental idea is that efficient
insurance markets will iron out adverse selection. In reality, however, there is a limit
to what insurers do to fight adverse selection. In some countries insurers assume a
socio-political role – either voluntarily or under political pressure – by providing cov-
erage to some individuals at a loss. By doing so, insurers may signal their ‘responsi-
bility to society’.65 Offering life insurance to HIV positive individuals at an acceptable
premium seems to have been such a gesture.
The insurance industry may thus choose to accept a certain level of adverse selec-
tion by cross subsidizing good and bad risks that should otherwise have been cate-
gorized under distinct pools.66 Indeed, legislators may also choose so-called ‘regula-
tory adverse selection’ by forbidding risk differentiation to a certain extent.67 In Ameri-
can legislative policy this is quite common and, although the European insurance
market is more relaxed and less regulated, it may show examples of such covert re-
distribution of wealth too. 68 EU non-discrimination laws may forbid differences in
premiums charged. Obviously, such a redistributional policy does not offer bound-
less possibilities for redistribution in an insurance market working efficiently, but it
seems that in practice there is some room for the insurance industry to manoeuvre.
Some degree of redistribution imposed by insurers on customers seems possible in
saturated markets where newcomers are not laying in wait to penetrate and force
competitors into a cutthroat race to the lowest premium.69 Moreover, in those markets
where the insured that pose a ‘good risk’ are less mobile – for instance because the
cost of switching insurers outweighs the expected benefits, or because insurers are
chosen because of their trustworthy reputation rather [266] than the quality of their
service – there are opportunities for insurers not to follow theory but stick to the prac-
tice of suboptimal risk differentiation.70
This is why legislators should be most careful with introducing compulsory insurance:
it may fight the symptoms of adverse selection but if the disease is insurer inactivity,
rendering the insurance compulsory will not cure the disease.71 Indeed, insurers op-
erating in an inefficient market who secure their market by the introduction of com-
pulsory insurance are bound to apply less risk and premium differentiation than
would be advisable.72
65 Note that European competition law naturally forbids price cartels but it does allow agreement on
common coverage of certain types of risks. See Commission Regulation EC 358/2003 on agreements,
decisions and concerted practices in the insurance sector.
66 Thomas 2007, p. 108.
67 Faure 2007, p. 81 et seq.
68 Cf. Von Ungern-Sternberg 2004, p. 32-33 who points out that sometimes insurers decide not to raise
premiums proportionate to the change in risk perception because of the feared consequences for socie-
ty.
69 On the correlation between demand elasticity and potential for redistribution, e.g., Ogus 2006, p. 229.
70 Von Ungern-Sternberg 2004, p. 81 argues that this is more likely to occur in B2C markets than in pro-
fessional markets.
71 On compulsory insurance, e.g., Faure and Hartlief 2006, p. 223 et seq. On criteria for introducing
compulsory insurance, see, e.g., Faure 2006, p. 149-168.
72 Cohen and Dehejia 2004, p. 357 et seq.
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4. Appraisal
Testing the theoretical assumptions of insurance law and economics to empirical evi-
dence bears some resemblance to trying to find the Abominable Snowman: known
by many but actually seen by few. We are all familiar with theory on moral hazard,
and adverse selection, but can we now claim to have actually seen them? Yes and
no. Unlike the Snowman, the number of sightings of moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion is considerable but there are counter indications as well: insurance demand is
not always perfectly rational, moral hazard does not always seem to be a serious
problem and propitious selection has been spotted as well. Moreover, insurers do not
always follow the antidotes that theory provides them. This implies that the theoreti-
cal assumptions of insurance law and economics can be nuanced in this regard. Far
from being killed by empiricism, insurance law and economics can benefit from em-
pirical findings. Perhaps in the long run these findings can even be framed in a true
‘behavioural insurance law and economics’ perspective. Having said that, the previ-
ous discussion has not generated broadly applicable suggestions for policymakers to
address insurance law issues in general. In fact, if problems arise in specific product
areas, these need to be dealt with specifically rather than by promulgating general
rules for non-existing problems.
[267-276]
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